Cable BOLIVIAN CORRUPTION: MORE SCANDALS LIKELY

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ412	2009-03-17 18:16	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0412/01 0761816
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FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0311
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8881
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6256
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0230
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7440
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4487
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4820
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 4371
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6188
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7102
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1870
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1708
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 000412 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ENRG EPET EINV BL EFIN PINR
ASEC, SNAR 
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN CORRUPTION:  MORE SCANDALS LIKELY 
(C-AL9-00459) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 21121 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 373 
     ¶C. LA PAZ 345 
     ¶D. LA PAZ 305 
     ¶E. LA PAZ 303 
     ¶F. LA PAZ 176 
     ¶G. 08 LA PAZ 2614 
     ¶H. 08 LA PAZ 313 
     ¶I. LA PAZ 247 
 
Classified By: Acting EcoPol Counselor Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4b,d 
 
 
- - - - 
Summary 
- - - - 
 
¶1.  (C)  As the Bolivian state extends its participation in 
the economy well beyond its capacity, corruption scandals are 
likely to surface across any number of the poorly managed and 
highly politicized state enterprises.  The state hydrocarbon 
company (YPFB) is far and away the largest of these companies 
and the recently uncovered corruption involving its former 
president Santos Ramirez spotlights corruption at the top, 
but the rot runs much deeper.  The scandal triggered the now 
standard spin of blaming the U.S. Embassy and opposition 
leaders, but on March 11 Ramirez was thrown out of the MAS by 
the party's ethics committee.  The treatment of Ramirez by 
Morales hints that he is walking a fine line between showing 
himself tough on corruption and making sure his own party 
doesn't turn on him.  The inner workings of the Morales 
Cabinet are still largely a matter of guesswork, but the 
continual reshuffling of the same names through cabinet posts 
indicates a lack of depth in trusted MAS leadership, a dirth 
of experienced managers, and the desire by senior leadership 
to continue to centralize power around themselves.  The 
administration claims that individuals are responsible for 
corruption, but the opposition is pointing (correctly) to a 
MAS economic model where corruption seems sure to thrive. 
End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Santos Ramirez:  A Necessary Sacrifice 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C)  The scandal at the state hydrocarbon company (YPFB) 
involving the murder of a Bolivian businessman and alleged 
payoffs to then YPFB President Ramirez has led directly to 
the expulsion of Embassy Second Secretary Francisco Martinez, 
as the Morales administration tries to deflect blame for the 
corruption away from itself and prominent MAS leaders (Ref. 
B-G).  MAS leadership has identified corruption as a 
potential Achilles heal and is concocting conspiracy theories 
(many at our expense) to salvage their credibility on the 
issue. Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca allegedly briefed 
the incoming OAS Ambassador that, because of his senior 
position in Washington, he would be charged with vigorously 
refuting any negative stories about Bolivian stewardship of 
the economy, or commitment to fighting narcotics trafficking 
or corruption.  Choquehuanca identified these three issues as 
vulnerabilities that "could derail" Evo Morales' "change 
agenda." 
 
¶3.  (C)  On March 11, Ramirez was kicked out of the MAS by 
their ethics committee and may face jail time over the 
scandal.  It is inaccurate however, to conclude that Morales 
did everything he could to destroy a political rival.  We 
believe that Morales made a calculated decision that he 
couldn't stand publicly behind Ramirez and needed the cover 
of a public investigation (which buys him time to figure out 
a way to make sure it leads to the opposition (Septel), us, 
or elsewhere).  Additionally, Ramirez's party expulsion by 
the rank and file members of the MAS creates the impression 
that his expulsion was beyond the control of Morales.  The 
president initially deflected calls for Ramirez to be kicked 
 
LA PAZ 00000412  002 OF 005 
 
 
out of the MAS, but in the end Ramirez had to be sacrificed 
in the fight against corruption; it is a sacrifice that fits 
the administration's rhetoric that eliminating corruption is 
simply a matter of weeding out corrupt individuals wherever 
they may be. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ruling MAS party congresswoman Ana Lucia Reis 
(strictly protect) told us during a February 4 meeting of MAS 
congressmen that Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera told 
congressmen that the administration was genuinely concerned 
about combating corruption and that "the hand of the United 
States is surely behind this."  After initially supporting 
Ramirez in the face of the corruption charges, Reis said 
Morales "cut off" his longtime friend and political ally 
after reading a police report in late January detailing 
Ramirez's role in the latest scandal and "several others, 
most of which are not public; they found skeletons 
everywhere."  Lower House President Edmundo Novillo and other 
MAS leaders allegedly told Reis that Morales was "furious" 
when he learned the full scope of Ramirez's dirty dealing and 
immediately decided he wasn't worth the political capital of 
defending. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cabinet Infighting, Rumors Abound 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C)  Dissident MAS member and Senate Vice President Luis 
Gerald Ortiz (strictly protect) told PolOff the fallout from 
the Ramirez case is dividing the party in congress.  Many MAS 
congressmen owe their political careers to Ramirez and have 
abiding friendships with him.  He is more popular among MAS 
congressmen than Vice President Garcia Linera, much to 
Garcia's irritation, and was the shoe-in favorite to take 
Garcia's place on the ticket, leading to conspiracy theories 
about MAS opponents setting him up. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ramirez was also a direct rival for influence with 
Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana.  In that 
sense, abandoning Ramirez to "justice" was also a victory for 
Quintana.  While Quintana remains unpopular among the 
indigenous and social group portion of the MAS base 
(ostensibly pro-Ramirez before the scandal), he remains an 
effective operator for Morales.  Indeed, Morales is reported 
to have recently told a MAS caucus that, "Quintana got me 
Fernandez (former governor of Pando, now in jail), what have 
you given me?".  Rumor mills contend that Quintana "has 
something" on Morales, but a more straightforward 
interpretation of his staying power is his effectiveness as a 
MAS hatchet man. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Incestual Reshuffling of "The Family" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C)  Beyond the big three of Quintana (Presidency), Rada 
(Government), and Lineira (Vice-President), the Morales 
Cabinet has been a constantly shifting mixture of generally 
the same people.  This may simply reflect a lack of qualified 
MAS members, but it also has the effect of keeping any 
corruption within "the family."  The newest member of the 
cabinet, Patricia Ballivian, left her post as Minister of the 
Bolivian Highway Administration (ABC), to head the Ministry 
of Development.  Corruption charges dogged her at ABC and the 
former minister, Jose Maria Bakovic, postulated in an 
interview that she was named development minister simply to 
protect her and the government from facing additional 
corruption charges and her shady dealings with Ramirez and 
the Brazilian construction firm OAS. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The same reshuffling is happening at YPFB, where 
ex-Minister of Hydrocarbons, Carlos Villegas has been 
appointed as the new head of YPFB (Note:  Such direct 
appointments are technically illegal, as the Senate should be 
asked to approve all new heads of state enterprises.  End 
 
LA PAZ 00000412  003 OF 005 
 
 
note.)  Moreover, the "watchdogs" (superintendents) across 
industrial sectors have been politicized.  For example, 
within hydrocarbons the ex-president of YPFB, Guillermo 
Aruquipa is now the superintendent of hydrocarbons, charged 
with monitoring the company he once headed. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
"Teflon Evo" Avoids Investigation and Contract Reaffirmed 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  On March 4, the senate commission set up to 
investigate the YPFB corruption case agreed not to 
investigate President Morales for decreeing YPFB's authority 
to use trust funds to enter into no bid contracts.  In a 
compromise with the commission's president Walter Gutieras, 
from the opposition party Podemos,  MAS members of the 
commission were able to exempt Morales from investigation. 
In exchange, four current and former members of the Morales 
administration will be investigated:  Carlos Villegas 
(ex-minister of hydrocarbons and the new president of YPFB), 
Saul Avalos (ex-minister of hydrocarbons), Luis Arce 
(minister of treasury), and Guillermo Aruquipa 
(superintendent of hydrocarbons).  Two days later, the MAS 
senators publicly retracted their signatures and Morales 
claimed they had been "misled" by the opposition members of 
the commission.  In the end however, the signatures were left 
in.  Additionally, in spite of the scandal, Villegas 
reaffirmed the contract with Catler-Uniservice to construct 
the controversial gas separation facility. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Corruption, Corruption: Who or What's to Blame 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C)  For the MAS, at least publicly, corruption is 
simply the result of corrupt individuals; purge the dirty 
people and corruption will disappear.  For the opposition, 
the system being put in place by the MAS facilitates 
corruption.  Senate President Oscar Ortiz recently published 
a document that outlines how presidential decrees which 
create "strategic enterprises" and fund them with special 
trust funds (fidecomisos) are leading to a system rife with 
corruption.  To date, nine such public strategic enterprises 
have been created and funded by decree without Senate 
approval:  The Food Production Support Company (EMAPA), Milk 
of Bolivia (LACTEOSBOL), Paper of Bolivia (PAPEBOL), 
Cardboard of Bolivia (CARTONBOL), Business of Marketing 
(EDCO), Cement of Bolivia (ECEBOL), Bolivian Customs Deposits 
(DAB), Sugar of Bolivia (AZUCARBOL), Aviation of Bolivia 
(BoA).  Moreover, six previously existing enterprises (some 
taken over by the state during the Morales tenure) have 
received access to trust funds by decree for particular 
expansion projects:  Minera Huanuni, Mutun Steel (ESM), The 
Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), Vinto Metals, Entel 
(the nationalized telephone company), and YPFB.  In all, 
there are now 15 national strategic companies and every one 
of them creates a unique opportunity for corruption and 
political manipulation.  According to Ortiz, close to US$2 
billion has been placed in trust funds for these strategic 
companies. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
YPFB -- The Largest Example 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C)  Beyond the well-documented case of Santos Ramirez 
at the top, corruption can be found throughout YPFB and the 
hydrocarbon sector.  Before listing four areas where 
corruption likely thrives, it should be noted that it has 
been over a year since YPFB published its previously 
extensive quarterly reports.  Since that time, no one can say 
how much money has flowed into or out of the company or, 
concretely, what activities the company has undertaken.  Four 
areas of corruption revolve around:  contraband, illicit 
sales, relations with the Venezuelan state company PdVSA, and 
 
LA PAZ 00000412  004 OF 005 
 
 
equipment purchases. 
 
¶12.  (C)  First, hydrocarbons in Bolivia are highly 
subsidized and a brisk contraband business exists with the 
country's neighbors.  According to a major daily, at least 60 
percent of employees at the National Migration Service have 
been dismissed for acts of corruption over the last year and 
a half.  Gas canisters and diesel are two of the most 
lucrative smuggled items.  YPFB, either at its refineries or 
at its service stations is reportedly tightly entangled in 
smuggling networks. (Note:  Hydrocarbons are not the only 
contraband products.  Still under senate investigation, the 
highly publicized case linking Minister Quintana to 33 trucks 
in Pando State also involves the illegal movement of 
merchandise across borders. End note.)  Second, because of 
diesel shortages, quantitative limits on sales have been 
imposed.  For a price however, these limits can be overlooked 
at the YPFB refineries, where middle men do a brisk business 
supplying necessary diesel to Santa Cruz farmers.  Third, 
YPFB's relations with PdVSA are opaque.  A former Treasury 
Vice Minister told us that in part financial problems at YPFB 
were exacerbated because it could not produce purchase 
receipts from PdVSA for diesel imports, and thus could not be 
reimbursed for those purchases by the Treasury. 
Additionally, and not surprisingly, an untested partnership 
between the newly created YPFB exploration company SIPSA and 
PdVSA won the first drilling contract from the now wholly 
nationalized Andina (formerly majority owned by Repsol).  It 
promptly spent $6 million to charter a ship solely for the 
purpose of bringing a drilling rig directly from Venezuela 
(Ref. G).  Finally, equipment purchases with these 
unsupervised trust funds (especially used equipment) are 
being criticized across the state enterprises.  For YPFB, the 
latest accusations revolve around faulty home gas connection 
monitors being installed in the poor, suburban areas of La 
Paz. (Note:  The newly appointed interim Prefect in Pando 
Rafael Bandeira is being accused of purchasing used 
replacement parts for the state governments vehicle fleet 
worth more that the vehicles themselves.  End note.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
A Quick and Dirty Laundry List 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C)  Accusations of corruption are consistent and 
growing across the public sector enterprises.  The companies 
are operated by inexperienced political operatives under a 
cloak of secrecy.  For example, when PAPEBOL (paper) was 
formed, private sector industry contacts said that they were 
never consulted and state factory plans emerged out of secret 
government meetings (Ref. H).  Moreover, the used machinery 
PAPEBOL planned to purchase was obsolete and inappropriate 
for the recycled paper to be manufactured.  The milk company 
was launched without consideration of where the raw supply 
would come from, leading private executives to fear disloyal 
competition (and pressure on producers to sell to the state 
companies).  There have also been corruption allegations made 
about kickbacks by a water company (EPSAS) to government 
officials (Ref. I), plane leases for the new national airline 
BOA, the sale of visas, and bribes to police for political 
cooperation (Ref. C).  Finally, one may reasonably ask why 
Entel, the nationalized telephone company, recently donated 
23 computer systems to the Bolivian Workers Union (COB). 
While not explicit corruption, the Bolivian state is in a 
position to arbitrarily reward and punish through a growing 
network of public companies. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Additionally, the government lauds the threat of 
punitive action or expropriation over much of the private 
sector.  For example, an electric company executive told us 
that he was pressured to allow COMIBOL (the State Mining 
Corporation) to have a ten percent stake in a hydroelectric 
expansion.  When asked what service they provided to the 
company, the executive just laughed.  In agriculture, 
following the export ban on cooking oil in the spring of 
 
LA PAZ 00000412  005 OF 005 
 
 
2008, companies must now have all exports "approved" by the 
Ministry of Agriculture.  While our contacts say they have 
had no serious problems to date, it is a clear political 
lever held over the lowland agricultural producers. 
Additionally, potential disloyal competition for the purchase 
of agricultural production looms in the form of EMAPA, the 
Food Production Support Company. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶15.  (C)  The Bolivian state now controls close to a quarter 
of the economy and a broad swath of economic actors have been 
created whose actions do not necessarily correspond to profit 
motives.  With lax oversight, political goals, and 
inexperienced managers, identifying and stopping corruption 
at all levels of state enterprises will be a difficult task 
indeed.  It should be noted that corruption in prior 
governments was also rampant.  But beyond creating a state 
oriented system where corruption will thrive, a difference 
between the Morales administration and prior governments is 
that in the past little public emphasis was given to the 
issue and few measurable promises were made to combat it. 
Morales, by contrast, has made the wholesale "elimination" of 
corruption a cornerstone of his political discourse.  Our 
contacts (even some MAS contacts) confirm that corruption is 
at least as bad in this administration as in prior 
governments and that the MAS has set themselves up for a fall 
by claiming to be anti-corrupt saints.  Unfortunately 
however, even MAS stalwarts like Ramirez appear more 
interested in lining their pockets than living up to the 
promise to break with Bolivia's long tradition of corruption. 
 
URS

Cuatro periódicos condenan la decisión de WikiLeaks de publicar sus cables

Tweet "The Guardian", "New York Times", "El País" y "Der Spiegel"- condenaron hoy la decisión del portal WikiLeaks de publicar sin editar su archivo de 250.000 cables diplomáticos de EEUU, dejando al descubierto los nombres de miles de informantes.

En un comunicado conjunto, los rotativos, que han publicado en el pasado detalles de algunos de estos cables diplomáticos, señalan que este paso del portal creado por el australiano Julian Assange puede poner en peligro la vida de muchas personas.

"Lamentamos la decisión tomada por WikiLeaks de publicar los cables sin editar del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos, que podrían poner en peligro a las fuentes", subraya la nota de los cuatro diarios.

"Nuestras relaciones previas con WikiLeaks se desarrollaron bajo la premisa de que sólo publicaríamos cables sujetos a una edición conjunta e integral", afirma el comunicado.

"Continuaremos defendiendo nuestros proyectos de colaboración anteriores. No podemos sin embargo defender la publicación innecesaria de la base de datos al completos. Es más, la condenamos conjuntamente", agregan los cuatro periódicos.

"La decisión de publicarlos le corresponde única y exclusivamente a Julian Assange. Él debe responsabilizarse de esa decisión", puntualizan.

Varias organizaciones humanitarias, diplomáticos y medios de comunicación han pedido a Assange que no publique el archivo completo sin antes contar con la protección de las fuentes.

El archivo contiene miles de cables en los que se identifica a numerosas fuentes, inclusive catalogadas como "estrictamente protegidos", un término utilizado por Estados Unidos para marcar los documentos cuya publicación podría poner en peligro a las personas que en ellos aparecen.

Además, en los cables aparecen también activistas y personas perseguidas por sus gobiernos y se mencionan instalaciones gubernamentales muy sensibles.

WikiLeaks empezó a divulgar los cables en diciembre de 2010 por un acuerdo con varios medios de comunicación.

Estos medios seleccionaron cuidadosamente los cables y antes de publicarlos retiraron cualquier información sensible que pudiera poner en peligro las fuentes.

WikiLeaks justificó hoy la publicación de los documentos al afirmar que su trabajo se ha visto comprometido por la "imprudencia" de "The Guardian", que en un libro sobre el portal reveló las claves para acceder a información sensible de su página web.

"The Guardian", por su parte, calificó de "sinsentido" la acusación y explicó que, aunque el libro citaba la clave para acceder a información confidencial de las embajadas de EEUU, se suponía que ésta "caducaba y sería borrada en unas horas".

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"Si alguien hubiera considerado que el libro comprometía la publicación de algunos documentos, WikiLeaks tuvo siete meses para borrarlos", dijo el portavoz.

El libro "WikiLeaks", que desveló detalles de la personalidad de Assange, fue escrito por el jefe de investigación del periódico, David Leigh, y uno de sus corresponsales, Luke Harding.

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"Nos han entregado más de 16 mil cables de Colombia y Venezuela", dijo el director de El Espectador, Fidel Cano, en una nota publicada por el diario ayer.

La información, guardada en una memoria de computadora, fue entregada a Cano a principios de febrero durante una cita en las afueras de Londres.

A cambio de que El Espectador pudiera publicar la información, Cano debió firmar un contrato en el que se comprometió, entre otras cosas, a "no compartir con nadie la información y a trabajarla con personal de máxima confianza".

Cano dijo haberse reunido directamente con Julian Assange, fundador de WikiLeaks, quien le advirtió que llevaba "mucha información" y de la cual dijo que "es bueno que se conozca en su país (Colombia)".

El Espectador, fundado en 1887, se suma a los diarios Página 12 de Argentina, El Comercio de Perú y La Jornada de México que han recibido información de manera exclusiva y directa de WikiLeaks.

Al igual que El Espectador, una editora del periódico peruano tuvo que viajar a Londres para adquirir los despachos, según informó el diario el 13 de febrero.

Cable de la Embajada de EEUU sobre la acusación del fiscal boliviano a la CIA

Tweet El fiscal de Bolivia asegura que Eduardo Rózsa, implicado en un supuesto compló terrorista, tenía contacto con la CIA

ID: 247998
Date: 2010-02-09 16:01:00
Origin: 10LAPAZ35
Source: Embassy La Paz
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0035 0401601
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FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
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INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000035

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN PROSECUTOR TIES TERROR CASE TO CIA

CLASSIFIED BY: William Mozdzierz, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission,
State, La Paz; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) Summary: The Bolivian prosecutor investigating a 2009
alleged domestic terrorism plot claims that the perpetrators'
leader, Eduardo Rozsa, had been in regular contact with a former
CIA employee and kept him informed of the group's activities in
Bolivia. The prosecutor's assertion is the first specific GOB
allegation of U.S. involvement in the Rozsa affair, in which the
Bolivian government maintains it thwarted an attempt to set up a
separatist military force, as well as a conspiracy to assassinate
Bolivian President Evo Morales. Although the prosecutor stopped
short of accusing the CIA of backing Rozsa's mercenary group, we
can expect that GOB officials will make that claim, regardless of
the evidence. End summary.



2. (SBU) Marcelo Soza, the prosecutor in charge of investigating
the April 2009 Rozsa case, announced February 5 that a review of
Rozsa's computer hard drive had uncovered evidence of email
communication between Rozsa and an alleged ex-CIA employee (a U.S.
citizen named Belovays). According to Soza, Belovays had been
active in the Balkans wars, where he supposedly met Rozsa and
became his mentor. An internet search on Belovays suggested that
he has since died, Soza reported (Rozsa and two others were killed
in a police raid; another two suspects are in custody). Soza
claimed that Rozsa's computer files show that Rozsa was in constant
contact with Belovays -- who, Soza said, is assumed to have been in
Bolivia at some point -- and kept him informed of his group's
activities and plans.



3. (SBU) Soza did not provide any details of the alleged exchanges
between Rozsa and Belovays, nor characterized Belovays's role
beyond asserting that the alleged former agent had been aware of
Rozsa's conspiracy. The Bolivian press has so far reported the
story straight, sticking strictly to Soza's account but featuring
headlines such as, "Soza Says CIA Knew Rozsa's Plans" and "Rozsa
Informed CIA Agent of Work."



4. (C) Comment: Soza's initial claims may be limited in scope, but
we expect that Bolivian government officials will not feel
themselves similarly bound by actual evidence. For nearly a year,
the GOB has maintained that Rozsa and his group represented a grave
threat and that they were backed by enemies of President Morales
(including prominent opposition and Santa Cruz civic leaders, who
are increasingly the target of Soza's investigation). The
Bolivian government is almost certain to seize upon this
opportunity to link the U.S. "empire" to the alleged conspiracy and
substantiate Morales's wildest claims about American skullduggery.
Creamer

Cable de la Embajada de EEUU sobre la operación antiterrorista emprendida por el Gobierno de Bolivia

Tweet Los diplomáticos se preguntan si la supuesta trama antiterrorista no es una "excusa" para perseguir a los opositores de Santa Cruz

ID: 204756
Date: 2009-04-29 21:20:00
Origin: 09LAPAZ635
Source: Embassy La Paz
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 09LAPAZ593 09LAPAZ600
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0635/01 1192120
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INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8966
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6348
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RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6259
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RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7196
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1960
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1767
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000635

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PHUM, PINR, ENVR, ASEC, PTER, BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: "TERRORISM" EXCUSE FOR MASS ARRESTS?

REF: A. LA PAZ 600
B. LA PAZ 593

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

1. (C) Summary: The Morales administration may use an April
16 police team raid in opposition-dominated Santa Cruz, in
which police shot and killed three alleged terrorists,
arrested two more, and reportedly found a separate weapons
cache (Reftels A, B), to initiate arrests of the political
opposition. On April 28, the government arrested two
additional suspects and identified more, one of whom is an
Embassy contact and leader of a human rights NGO. Some
opposition members speculated that Vice President Alvaro
Garcia Linera and Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana
orchestrated the April 16 raid to provide a rationale for
such arrests. Post's Cruceno contacts did not return
repeated calls. Government targets reportedly include
ex-Civic Committee President Branko Marinkovic, Prefect Ruben
Costas, and leaders of CAINCO (Santa Cruz Chamber of Trade
and Industry). Quintana and Defense Minister Walker San
Miguel provided conflicting reasons for ordering some 1,500
troops to Santa Cruz department (state), further raising
Cruceno suspicions of government actions. While Costas has
called for calm, some Crucenos are reportedly forming
fighting groups. Government-aligned media have reported on
potential USAID and CIA involvement with the alleged
terrorists. End summary.

- - - - - - - - - -
More Terrorists?
- - - - - - - - - -

2. (U) On April 28, police arrested two more men, one of them
an ex-security advisor to the Cruceno Youth Union (UJC) Juan
Carlos Gueder Bruno and the other Alcides Mendoza Masavi,
alias "Commander Mojeno." Police said the two arrested men
had supplied arms to the alleged terrorists. Police also
said they believed there were three other terrorist cell
members involved, largely based on an interview Rozsa gave
before leaving Hungary, in which he said "only five people
know of my arrival (in Santa Cruz)." According to Gueder
Bruno's wife, the police did not show an arrest warrant, as
required by law.

3. (C) A report in leading local daily La Razon also cited
the release of an arrest warrant for human rights lawyer Hugo
Acha Melgar, husband of opposition alternate Congress member
Roxana Gentile (UN party). PolOffs met twice with Acha in
Santa Cruz, who was investigating the September 2008 Pando
conflict in his capacity as head of Human Rights Foundation -
Bolivia, an affiliate of the larger Human Rights Foundation
group. He was preparing a report detailing a high degree of
Morales administration involvement to provoke violence in
Pando. Acha confided to PolOffs that he was under constant
threat by groups affiliated with the ruling Movement Toward
Socialism party (MAS), and that he was unable to travel to La
Paz for fear of arbitrary detention. Acha gave MILGP a copy
of a late 2008 warrant issued for his arrest, which he said
was related solely to his continued Pando investigations.
According to Gentile, Acha is currently in the U.S.

4. (U) Police also identified Alejandro Melgar Pereira as a
member of the terrorist cell and the purchaser of a vehicle
for Rozsa, which was supposedly sighted at Cardinal Terrazas'
home the night of the April 14 bomb explosion. The car had
been the property of Carlos Guillen, president of popular
Santa Cruz company Blooming. Melgar, reportedly in hiding,
was president of the Center for Arbitration and
Reconciliation for CAINCO, Santa Cruz's Chamber of Trade and
Industry, from 1997 to 2001 and president of Cotas from 2000
to 2001. Police said he had aliases of "El Viejo, Superman,
and Lucas." According to CAINCO, Melgar is currently on
their list of recommended lawyers, but holds no official
position.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
"Proofs" of Terror Cell
- - - - - - - - - - - -

5. (U) While the government has asserted it recovered large
amounts of information in the April 16 raid, it said it has
released only "10 percent" of its information. Thus far, the
government's statements have been limited to assertions and
two contested "proofs," detailed below.

6. (U) Government Minister Alfredo Rada first presented on
April 22 a series of pictures which he stated showed Cruceno
right-wing activist Mauricio Iturri practicing shooting in a
terrorist training camp with a large group of well-organized
paramilitaries. Rada said Iturri was connected with Rozsa's
terrorist cell. However, news quickly leaked that not only
was Iturri not actually in the picture, but the pictures were
downloaded by Rada from the popular website Facebook and
showed only a team of paintball players. The government
subsequently removed Rada from the case.

7. (U) On April 26, government investigator Sosa held a press
conference in which he showed images taken from a cell phone
video purportedly showing Rozsa, Magyarosi, and Dwyer talking
about the possibilities of killing President Morales. Sosa
said the three were discussing how to throw explosives and
about a missed opportunity to blow up a ship in Lake Titicaca
where government officials had met. Sosa concluded that
"with this evidence it is confirmed that the dismantled gang
came to the country with terrorist purposes" and termed their
goal "magnicide" (i.e. assassination of a king or ruler).
However, according to press reports, while it does appear the
three are captured in the video, the video's soundtrack is
almost completely unintelligible. Sosa said he would soon
unveil the source of the video, whom press reports guessed
was Rozsa's chauffeur, but that he was "gravely ill" with
diabetes and therefore could not appear publicly.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Troops Sent to Santa Cruz
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

8. (U) Presidency Minister Quintana and Defense Minister
Walker San Miguel confirmed April 27 that 1500 troops had
been sent to Santa Cruz department, but they gave conflicting
reasons for their presence. Quintana said the troops had
been sent in response to the "terrorism outbreak," while San
Miguel said the only reason was to reinforce the borders
against increased narco-trafficking. Other news reports said
40 percent of the Bolivian armed forces were now concentrated
in the department. According to official reports, troops
were being sent to Santa Cruz frontier zones, including San
Jose de Chiquitos, San Matias, and Robore.

9. (C) According to April 27 reporting from Santa Cruz,
troops were moving in the department, but it was impossible
to verify the number and their destinations. Some
interviewed said there were as few as 250, while others
confirmed the number of troops was 1500 and that of these 300
had riot control gear. Sources reported that Crucenos are
developing fighting/defense groups and are equipped with
weapons such as long rifles and hand guns.

10. (U) Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas issued a call to
"maintain the peace" and said the only purpose for the
increase in troops in the department "was to frighten the
public." Santa Cruz is currently calm.

- - - - - - - - -
Rumors Run Rampant
- - - - - - - - -

11. (C) Post has reached out to several contacts in Santa
Cruz, including CAINCO and Civic Committee members, but none
will return our calls, at least directly. At CAINCO, only
secretaries are "available," while at the Santa Cruz Civic
Committee, phones are simply off the hook. Many Crucenos
believe the central government has tapped their phones.

12. (C) In meetings in La Paz, a contact who said he was
close to Branko Marinkovic and other Cruceno leaders told
Poloff that Vice President Garcia Linera and Presidency
Minister Quintana had planned the entire sequence of events
over the last six months, including the recruitment of
Rozsa's group to "get Branko," Costas, and others. However,
he was not able to further source the rumor. According to an
article in Spanish newspaper El Pais (reprinted in local
Bolivian press), a source called "Comandante Gonzalo" also
said the Bolivian government had hired Rozsa in August 2008.

13. (C) There is also rampant speculation about President
Morales' traditional May 1st speech, in which he is expected
by many to announce nationalization of companies based in
Santa Cruz, potentially including Cotas or food industries.
If the latter, many expect Branko Marinkovic's cooking oil
and other companies to be taken in the name of "food
security."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rumors Fueled by Public Statements
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14. (U) The rumor mill has been fueled by public statements
by the government and affiliated social groups. On April 26,
President Morales said he had asked his legal advisors to
draw up a supreme decree allowing the government to
confiscate goods from businesses and their owners linked to
terrorism. Constitutional experts were in general agreement
that the new constitution does not permit such seizures, but
Vice President Garcia Linera said "one of the basic
principles of the constitution is the unity of Bolivians...
who are directed to sanction those who seek to create
material and violent conditions to separate the country."
Further, state news cited the 2002 Organization of American
States (OAS) Convention Against Terrorism, which the newscast
said approved confiscation of property from terrorists.

15. (U) The same day, social group leader Isaac Avalos
accused ex-Civic Committee President Branko Marinkovic of
hiring the group of alleged terrorists. Avalos said he did
not have any proof, but that "several campesinos" had told
him they recognized Rozsa from past public acts in which
Marinkovic participated as Committee president.

16. (U) On April 28, the prosecutor's office reported they
would announce a list of people who had provided economic
assistance to the alleged terrorists within 48 hours. Vice
President Garcia Linera said the state would be "merciless"
with those behind the plot.

- - - - - - - - -
USG Also Targeted?
- - - - - - - - -

17. (U) A day earlier, on April 27, government-aligned news
service Bolpress published a report on a supposed complex
international web of support for the alleged terrorist cell.
The article cited Vice President Garcia Linera as requesting
Argentinean collaboration to find former members of the
"carapintadas" (members of the Argentine army who rioted
against the government as part of the country's "Dirty War")
affiliated with Rozsa, including one Jorge Mones Ruiz. Mones
Ruiz, according to the article, came to Bolivia in December
2008 as part of the Colombian foundation "UnoAmerica," an
"ultra-right group" associated with the Heritage Foundation
and dependent on the CIA for funding. The article states
that "UnoAmerica" is supported by USAID and the National
Endowment Foundation (NED), which it calls the "social face"
of the CIA and a major funder of opposition movements in


South America.

18. (U) Also on April 27, President Morales (somewhat
cryptically) identified the U.S. as "the source of my
troubles," and said "the people will rise above" attempts by
any outside force "to humiliate the Bolivian government." On
the other hand, in its April 26 editorial, state newspaper
Cambio trumpeted offers to help in the search for the
terrorists, specifically including a statement by Charge and
members of the OAS.

- - - - - - - - - - -
Background: April 16
- - - - - - - - - - -

19. (U) At approximately 4 a.m. on April 16, members of an
elite police force raided a room on the fourth floor of the
Hotel Las Americas in downtown Santa Cruz. After instructing
the hotel staff to turn off all security cameras, the police
stormed hotel rooms of five men, killing three and arresting
two others. The three killed were Eduardo Rozsa Flores, a
Bolivian with multiple passports including Hungarian and
Croatian; Michael Dwyer, Irishman; and Arpad Magyarosi, a
Romanian of Hungarian descent. The police captured Mario
Tadic Astorga, a Bolivian of Croatian descent, and Elod
Toaso, a Hungarian. Initial reports, including a statement
from Vice President Garcia Linera, indicated there was a
30-minute gun battle between the police and the alleged
terrorists, but Hungarian Ambassador to Argentina Matyas
Jozsa said he believed the three were simply executed,
without any fight. Later press reports stated that an
examination of the hotel rooms showed no bullet holes in the
facing wall, and that one of the three was found in the
morgue with his hands bound.

20. (U) The same morning, police investigations turned up a
supposed weapons cache in the Santa Cruz EXPOCRUZ
fairgrounds, in the stand of telephone cooperative Cotas. one
of Santa Cruz's leading companies. The weapons cache at
first reportedly included pistols, dynamite, C4 explosives,
and ammunition corresponding to 5.56mm weapons. Vice
President Garcia Linera commented that some of the weapons
were not available in Bolivia and were evidence of an
international conspiracy. Through this discovery, police
linked the captured men to an April 14 explosion at Cardinal
Julio Terrazas official residence in Santa Cruz and a March
29 attack on Deputy Autonomy Minister Saul Avalos' Santa Cruz
home, in which the police reported the same kind of
explosives were used. However, in later news reports Defense
Minister Walker San Miguel was quoted as saying that many of
the weapons were stolen from a Bolivian military station on
the Paraguay border in December 2008, while other media
reported that many of the weapons were antique and unusable,
with some from the War of the Chaco in the mid-1930s.

- - - - - - -
Toaso Beaten?
- - - - - - -

21. (U) According to an April 28 statement by the Defensor
del Pueblo (human rights ombudsman), Elod Toaso was severely
beaten and abused during his arrest. A website,
www.toasoelod.com, showed pictures of his injuries to his
face, arms, and legs. Ambassador Jozsa said he had seen
Toaso personally, and that he had been beaten. Jozsa added
that Hungarian investigations showed Toaso was "far from
being a terrorist." State prosecutor Marcelo Sosa admitted
he was not present during the arrests, even though the
prosecutor's presence is required by Bolivian law. (Note:
Investigators Sosa and Eduard Mollinedo are based out of La
Paz, not Santa Cruz, as would normally be required,
ostensibly because of the case's connections to terrorist
activity. End note.)

- - - -
Comment
- - - -

22. (C) While rumors of government recruitment of the alleged
terrorists cannot be verified, the troop movements,
accusations by MAS-aligned social groups, Garcia Linera's
severe public statements, and the government's almost
conspiratorial use of Facebook pictures and low-quality
cellphone videos do seem to point toward a crackdown in Santa
Cruz similar to the 2008 state of siege in Pando. Without a
functioning judiciary, including the defunct Constitutional
Tribunal, the Morales administration has a relatively free
hand to move forward with large-scale arrests. Such actions
could result in a severe backlash from Crucenos, who are
nervous to the point of paranoia about Morales' motivations.
We may know more within the next 48 hours, when troops will
go to either frontier areas or closer toward Santa Cruz's
capital, Morales will make his May 1st speech, and the
prosecutor's office should release a fuller list of (Cruceno)
suspects. We are also confused by somewhat contradictory
comments regarding the USG by Morales and state-allied news
sources, but note that the government has yet to make any
explicit accusations regarding USG involvement with the
alleged terrorists. End comment.
URS

Cable de la Embajada sobre la reunión con Gobierno boliviano

Tweet

Informe sobre el encuentro del vicepresidente García Linera con el cuerpo diplomático para explicar los pormenores del 'caso Rózsa' 

 

 

ID: 203720
Date: 2009-04-23 11:06:00
Origin: 09LAPAZ600
Source: Embassy La Paz
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 08LAPAZ2374 08LAPAZ2483 09LAPAZ290 09LAPAZ593
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000600

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PHUM, PINR, ENVR, ASEC, BL, PTER
SUBJECT: GOB BRIEFS DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON "TERRORIST CELL"

REF: A. LA PAZ 593
B. LA PAZ 290
C. 08 LA PAZ 2483
D. 08 LA PAZ 2374

Classified By: Charge Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

1. (C) Summary: Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera
and other senior administration members, during an address to
the diplomatic corps on April 21, underscored the seriousness
of what they labeled a series of three terrorist attacks and
the presence of a terrorist cell with at least ten members.
On April 16, Bolivian police forces killed three alleged
terrorists in a downtown Santa Cruz hotel (reftel A). In an
interview released posthumously, the group's leader advocated
the secession of Santa Cruz department, Bolivia's largest and
most prosperous state, but explicitly denied having any plans
to attack La Paz or overthrow the government. Nevertheless,
Garcia Linera repeatedly pledged to carry the investigation
to its "final conclusions," raising fears of possible arrests
of members of the Santa Cruz-based political opposition.
President Evo Morales rejected requests by the Hungarian,
Irish, and Croatian governments to investigate the three
deaths, saying they had no right to demand explanations.
Charge reassured Garcia Linera that there was no USG
involvement as per President Obama's recent public statement;
the Vice President responded that the GOB knows that the USG
is with them. Striking his chest for emphasis, Garcia Linera
said "President Obama's words brought us here." End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation to Diplomatic Corps
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2. (C) Following the deaths of three and arrest of two
alleged terrorists April 16 in Santa Cruz by the Bolivian
SWAT team (reftel A), the Bolivian government has released
preliminary results of its ongoing investigation into what it
claims is a cell of at least ten terrorists. The government
said the group is also responsible for recent attacks on the
homes of Deputy Autonomy Minister Saul Avalos and Cardinal
Julio Terrazas. In a packed meeting of the diplomatic corps
April 21 in the Presidential Palace's Hall of Mirrors, Vice
President Alvaro Garcia Linera, Government Minister Alfredo
Rada, and Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana justified
the killing of the three alleged terrorists and reviewed what
they emphasized was just "ten percent" of the information
they had captured regarding the group's aims and activities.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
VP: "Terrorists" and "Assassins"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3. (C) Garcia Linera noted that after the explosion at
Cardinal Terraza's house, the government intensified its
focus on the suspected terrorist cell, leading ultimately to
the April 16 shootout at the Santa Cruz hotel. He said
during the raid the five men attacked the police with gunfire
and explosives. The vice president emphasized that the men
were neither tourists nor random fanatics, but rather part of
a structured terrorist cell that was well-funded and trained
to achieve their ultimate goal of secession for Santa Cruz
and the assassination of Morales, Garcia Linera, and "three
ministers."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Investigation Not a Witch Hunt, Really
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (C) Garcia Linera told the group of diplomats that La Paz
Prosecutor Marcelo Sosa was the case's main investigator and
said the government would abide by the results of the
investigation, including any established links to Santa Cruz
businessmen and/or political opposition members. Garcia
Linera said the effort would be impartial and would not be a
witch hunt. However, he pledged to take the results of the
investigation to their "final conclusion." (Note: Garcia
Linera used similarly firm language after the September 2008
violence in Pando (reftel B-D), after which the government
illegally jailed Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez and violently
detained over forty more, many of them prominent political
opposition members. End note.)

- - - - - - - - - -
Rada: Cell Structure
- - - - - - - - - -

5. (C) Government Minister Rada discussed the alleged
structure of the cell, including the five members found in
Bolivia. He said Hungarian-Bolivian Eduardo Rozsa Flores was
the leader of the group, that he had obtained the rank of
colonel in the Croatian army, and was believed to be
responsible for the murder of a journalist in Croatia. Rada
described Irishman Michael Martin Dwyer as second-in-command,
saying he had military and security experience. Rada said
Romanian-born Hungarian Arpad Magyarosi was used as a
sharpshooter/sniper. Rada referred to the two captured men,
Mario Tadic Astorga (a Croatian-Bolivian) and Elod Toaso (a
Hungarian), as a member of the Croat army responsible for the
Terrazas attack and as the main computer specialist,
respectively. Rada said that in addition to the five
captured or killed, information seized by the police
indicated there were others involved.

6. (C) Rada reported that after the gun battle, the police
found pistols, dynamite, C4 explosives, and ammunition
corresponding to 5.56mm weapons. Noting that the weapons
cache found at the Cotas stand in the ExpoCruz fairgrounds
did not include any weapons of this type, he said there were
likely other weapons caches in the ExpoCruz area. (Note: The
Embassy participates in the ExpoCruz fair only through its
association with the American Chamber of Commerce, and does
not have its own stand or storage area. End note.) Rada
said the materiel seized corresponded to the explosive
devices left at both Avalos' and Cardinal Terrazas' homes,
which included dynamite, C4, nails, and other metal pieces.
He then indicated the government had information showing the
group's next attacks included the president, vice president,
and three ministers (whom Rada left unnamed).

- - - - - - - - - - -
VP: We Want Your Help
- - - - - - - - - - -

7. (C) Garcia Linera spoke again, saying there was much more
information to be reviewed. He said the group had maps of
Bolivian military bases they apparently planned to attack,
that they were recruiting other members, and that they had
"specialized arms" even the Bolivian government did not
possess. The vice president said they found many photos,
some including Bolivians from Santa Cruz and Beni, and that
they were in the process of identifying these people. He
insisted the photos were not "montages" or
otherwise-assembled works by the government, and that the
photos also indicated there had been plans for an attack
around the January 25 constitutional referendum which did not
come to pass. He specifically referred to a photo of Rozsa
with Cruceno autonomy activist Mauricio Iturri and averred
that he was trained by Rozsa. Garcia Linera ended with a
simple plea to the assembled group, saying "we want your
help."

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Quintana: Troop Movements
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

8. (C) Presidency Minister Quintana then took the floor
briefly to note that, in his opinion, the attacks occurred
because the political opposition created a context in which
they were possible and because the government's authority in
the area was not strong enough. He identified six border
provinces within Santa Cruz department where the government
would deploy troops to strengthen control.

- - - - - - - -
Questions Remain
- - - - - - - -

9. (C) Despite the GOB's coordinated presentation that
maintained the group's intentions to assassinate the
president, in an interview with Hungarian television
(released posthumously and characterized as his "final
testimony"), Rozsa explicitly stated he did not seek to
attack the central government in La Paz or to assassinate
Morales or other administration officials. In a conversation
with Charge after the administration's presentation, the
German DCM remarked that it seemed there was "not enough" to
justify the government's claims of a well-funded terrorist
network, given that the supposed terrorists were easily
captured and did not appear to be well trained.

- - - - - - - - - - -
Charge Press Statement
- - - - - - - - - - -

10. (U) After the presentation, Charge met briefly with the
press, saying that "if asked" the USG would be pleased to
study potential assistance we could give to the
investigation. The Cubans offered assistance as well.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Morales Gets Mad at Europe
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

11. (U) In a press conference later on April 21, President
Morales bristled at requests by the governments of Hungary,
Ireland, and Croatia for more information about the deaths of
their citizens. Morales said the three countries "have no
authority to ask me for an explanation... I am tempted to
sue them, that is what I want to do, but I am not a lawyer.
How can they defend people who came here to attack the
president? That is very grave. I could think that they (the
governments) were the ones who sent them in to attack me, to
attack democracy." Irish Foreign Minister Michael Martin
said Morales was being unreasonable and mentioned evidence
suggesting the three men died in an "ambush" and not in a
prolonged gun battle. Similarly, Hungarian Foreign Minister
Peter Balazs said he doubted Rozsa and the others were
plotting assassinations. "We can assume they were the
victims of domestic Bolivian politics," he said.

- - - -
Comment
- - - -

12. (C) While the existence of a paramilitary group
dedicated to the defense and potential secession of Santa
Cruz seems clear, the other goals attributed to the group by
the Bolivian government are more difficult to verify.
Observers fear the government may leverage the group's
presence to go after the political opposition in Santa Cruz,
similar to their round-up of Pando political opposition.
Just as in Pando, the government has claimed sole prosecution
authority falls in the hands of police and investigators from
La Paz. Post notes that ex-Pando Prefect (and Morales rival)
Fernandez has now been in prison for seven months under
dubious legal pretext and without a trial. We are also wary,
given the president's penchant for accusing the Embassy of
supporting the opposition (and despite the vice president's
chest-pounding affirmation to Charge), of a potential GOB
accusation that the Embassy or the USG generally supported
Rozsa's "terrorist" attacks. End comment.
URS

Cable sobre los asesores venezolanos de Morales #cablegate #wikileaks

Tweet En marzo de 2006 la Embajada informa de las tensiones entre las personas que rodean al presidente

ID:

58799

Date:

2006-03-30 16:47:00

Origin:

06LAPAZ886

Source:

Embassy La Paz

Classification:

SECRET

Dunno:

Destination:

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000886 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PREL, BL, PINR SUBJECT: EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE (PART 1 OF 3) Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: President Morales is an astute domestic political operator but lacks confidence in his economic and international relations abilities. As a result, Morales has surrounded himself with three compartmented groups of advisers. The first are domestic political operators who implement his political vision and serve as the attack dogs for the President. The second group are Bolivian intellectuals that help shore up his decisionmaking in economics, intelligence and security, and international relations, and implement policies on the ground, including the Cuban doctors program, Venezuelan identification program, and Bolivian land reform. The third group is his Cuban and Venezuelan advisers, who seem to have growing influence with the President, trumping even his intellectual advisers. This cable is part one of three cables that looks at the President, who is in his circle of domestic advisers, and how he uses them, and their competition with the Cubans and Venezuelans for the President's confidence. End summary. -------------------------------------- Evo: The seasoned Bolivian politician -------------------------------------- 2. (C) Radical cocalero union leader turned President Evo Morales Ayma is a pragmatic leader whose domestic political instincts are extraordinarily acute. Morales is an expert at spinning stories in his favor, co-opting the platforms of his adversaries, dividing his opposition, and appealing to his bases. A leader with strong anti-democratic tendencies, over the years he has been known to bribe, threaten, and even physically intimidate anyone who has stood in his way, including government officials, politicians, and cocalero colleagues. He has shown great tactical flexibility and an ability to out maneuver even his most formidable political opponents to consolidate his own political power. Morales has developed a reputation for consulting advisers and social groups on domestic political issues, but is confident that he is the expert, the advisor and the final decision maker for those issues. (Comment: This is particularly true on the coca issue.) His cadre of domestic political advisers (SEPTEL), which include Senate President Santos Ramirez, lower chamber President Edmundo Novillo, his personal assistant Ivan Iporre, and Vice Minister of Government Coordination and personal attorney Hector Arce, tends to operate more as "yes men" who carry out the President's orders than as advisers with real influence on the President,s decisions. ---------------------------- Evo: The struggling student ---------------------------- 3. (C) While Morales excels at domestic political machinations, he is more like a struggling student in the areas of economics and international relations decisionmaking. A man who likes to be in control, Morales has shown an eagerness for learning what he needs to make his own decisions in these areas. He has sought out intellectual "experts," primarily from Bolivia,s public universities, to provide him tutoring in the areas he lacks. Morales often tunes out detailed economic discussions with foreign officials and will at times defer to his "experts" when speaking to the press, large groups, and even US officials on issues he is uncertain about. His domestic intellectual advisers (SEPTEL), who include Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana, and Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas, are largely leftist ideologues and have tended to have more influence with the President compared to his domestic political advisers because of his difficulty grasping complex economic theories and lack of experience in the international arena. Unfortunately, some of this advice borrows from a storehouse of discredited ideas and fantasyland assumptions. ------------------------------------------ LA PAZ 00000886 002 OF 002 Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator ------------------------------------------ 4. (S//NF) The third group is a pandora's box of Cuban and Venezuelan advisers, who may have growing influence with the President. While we do not know the extent of their presence, sensitive reporting indicates that Morales meets privately with his foreign advisers multiple times a week without any domestic advisers present. The same reporting also indicates that he receives both political and economic advice from the Cubans. Morales is implementing several programs initiated by the Cubans and Venezuelans in the areas of education, health, and citizen registration. Several of the President's domestic advisers are working hand in hand with the Cubans and Venezuelans, seeking to replace US markets with Venezuelan trade deals, and sensitive reporting says that they are regularly traveling to Cuba for political training. 5. (C) Comment: Morales has had a roller-coaster relationship with several of his key domestic advisers, especially Vice President Garcia Linera. He is highly suspicious by nature and is unlikely to tolerate advisers with their own agenda for power and recognition. Morales likely sees the Cuban and Venezuelan advisers as non-threatening to his domestic power. In addition, as an admirer of Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Morales probably is drawn by the longevity of their time in power and seeks to emulate their "success." If Morales grows wary of his domestic advisers he is likely to rely more heavily on his foreign advisers to carry out his vision. End comment. GREENLEE

Cable en el que Lieberman advierte sobre la presencia iraní en Bolivia y la relaciona con el uranio

Tweet Durante una gira sudamericana en 2009, el ministro de Exteriores israelí relaciona directamente el tamaño de la delegación diplomática de Irán en Bolivia con la búsqueda de uranio

ID: 220949
Date: 2009-08-14 20:49:00
Origin: 09LIMA1191
Source: Embassy Lima
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001191

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, PE
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM VISIT: REGIONAL TIES, IRAN, SHARED
THREATS

Classified By: Amb. P Michael McKinley for reasons 1.4b and d.

1. (C) Summary: Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
paid an official visit to Peru in late July as part of an
extended tour through South America. According to Israeli
Embassy contacts, the Minister's main goal was to strengthen
ties with friends and partners in the region and raise
awareness of the growing Iranian presence in Venezuela and
Bolivia. In his public interventions, Lieberman focused
largely on Middle Eastern issues and Iran while underplaying
their connection to local concerns. End Summary.

2. (U) During his July 26-28 visit to Peru, Foreign Minister
Lieberman met with President Alan Garcia, Foreign Minister
Jose Antonio Garcia Belaunde, Defense Minister Rafael Ray,
and Congress President Luis Alva Castro. He also did a full
page interview in the prominent newspaper El Comercio, and
attended a dinner hosted by Peru's Jewish Community for local
notables and diplomats. The Ambassador attended the dinner,
and chatted briefly with the FM on its margins (see notes
below).

Strengthening Regional, Bilateral Ties
--------------------------------------
3. (C) Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman's official
visit to Peru July 26-28 was the first by an Israeli Foreign
Minister in 23 years, according to Israeli diplomat Gali
Dagan. He described the South America tour as designed to
bolster Israel's relations beyond its traditional sphere of
concern (Europe and the US) and to diversify its foreign
policy focus beyond the Israel-Palestine issue and the
broader Middle East. Lieberman's trip included stops in
Colombia and Peru -- Israel's closest allies in South America
-- as well as Brazil and Argentina, Israel's most important
commercial partners here. Lieberman told the Ambassador that
the visits were useful in allowing him to present the
realities of Israel and described the Government of Argentina
as in crisis and in thrall to the Chavez model.

4. (C) Dagan noted that Israeli's positive relations with
Peru began with Peru's decision to support the establishment
of the state of Israel in the initial 1948 UN vote. He said
that Peru's small but influential Jewish community had
contributed to strong cultural and people-to-people ties
between the two countries. He added that Israeli trade with
and investment in Peru had grown in recent years, the latter
to $600 million, and said his government hoped this figure
would double within a few years. One of the Minister's
specific goals was to promote a Bilateral Investment Treaty,
currently under negotiation, which would help protect Israeli
investments and lay the foundation for a possible future free
trade agreement. Dagan also mentioned Israeli's security
relationship with Peru, including the recent sale of Spike
(anti-tank) missiles, but did not confirm Israel's rumors
concerning used F-16s. The FM visit also highlighted a
recent bilateral agreement to drop tourist visa requirements.

Concerns About Iran
-------------------
5. (C) The Foreign Minister emphasized the growing Iranian
presence in Venezuela and Bolivia, Dagan said. In his
meetings with GOP counterparts, FM Lieberman observed that
uncontrolled travel from Iran to Venezuela and Bolivia was
particularly worrisome because it meant that local
authorities would have no way of knowing who had entered
their countries and with what intentions. The Israeli FM
also mentioned concern about Iran's disproportionately large
diplomatic mission in Bolivia which the Israeli government
believed was connected with Iran's interest in gaining access
to Bolivia's uranium deposits.

Public Focus on Middle East
---------------------------
6. (SBU) Foreign Minister Lieberman's public comments
focused almost entirely on Middle East issues. In his dinner
speech and newspaper interview, after a nod to relations with
Peru, Lieberman spoke of the challenges to peace in the
Middle East. He said that the real conflict is not between
Israelis and Palestinians but between moderates and
extremists, and that the biggest threat faced by Arab
governments is not Israel, but Hamas, the Jihad, Hizbollah,

and the Muslim Brotherhood. He also dismissed the argument
that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are an obstacle to
peace, countering that tensions between Israelis and
Palestinians predated not only the 1967 war but also the 1948
founding of Israel. Lieberman argued that the biggest
problem in the Middle East is Iran, and warned of a regional
nuclear arms race if Iran acquires the bomb. He ended with a
call for the international community to work together to stop
radicalism everywhere in the world.

Comment: Failure to Connect
---------------------------
7. (C) Jewish community attendees at the dinner described
the speech as over-the-top but in line with Lieberman's
previous public rhetoric. One prominent Congressperson told
the Ambassador Lieberman's message appeared not directed at
Peru but to a broader international audience. Judging from
these representative reactions, it may have been helpful for
Lieberman to focus more on non-Middle East issues or to place
bilateral ties here in terms of international cooperation and
common international objectives.
MCKINLEY

Cable sobre el referéndum constitucional de Bolivia

Tweet

ID:	188540
Date:	2009-01-23 13:26:00
Origin:	09LAPAZ96
Source:	Embassy La Paz
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:	09LAPAZ11 09LAPAZ6 09LAPAZ62 09LAPAZ90
Destination:	VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHLP #0096/01 0231326 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 231326Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8742 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6115 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0078 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7298 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4344 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0330 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4679 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6085 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6963 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1731 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1617 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000096 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ENVR, BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606 B. LA PAZ 6 C. LA PAZ 11 D. LA PAZ 62 E. LA PAZ 90 Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 1. (C) Summary: With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Although the opposition has made inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent), and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural base to victory. After a series of national news articles raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008 recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure. However, a recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant electoral fraud is likely. While cheating seems unnecessary to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional clauses. Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and institute rule by decree. At both the national and regional levels, the margin of victory matters. A landslide for the MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the eastern departments, could spark more conflict. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - MAS Victory Seems Assured - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead, causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed constitution. (One government poll shows the "yes" vote winning by 66 percent.) However, many polls downplay or ignore the MAS' rural base. Almost as importantly, the MAS seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments, including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with Beni a distinct possibility. If the MAS can win at levels similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67 percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna" or eastern half of the country, they will have much more leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over implementing legislation. - - - - - - Polling Data - - - - - - 3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural). Recent national polls by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected, ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent, respectively. Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40 percent. However, our contacts tell us all these polls partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS has much of its base. A poll by Observatorio de Gestion Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus 31 percent against. Some estimate a six percent "bump" when the rural vote is included. 4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown by city or region indicate the constitution will easily win in at least four departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely with at least 70 percent support in each. The MAS has a distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well. In Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36. Polling data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution, by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is leaning for approval of the constitution. The Observatorio poll shows Beni evenly split as a department. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rural and Indigenous Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort across the country to rally against the constitution, the forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them, particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base in the Altiplano. Leading daily La Razon interviewed several community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters, and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the supporters had read the Constitution. Instead, the repeated message was that rural communities would take their marching orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of respondents said they had read much or all of the constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft text. In the countryside, the number of those reading the constitution is much lower. Post suspects disinterest, blind faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy, despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role. In addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution probably scares some potential readership away. 6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does exist, albeit for a variety of reasons. The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel A). In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous issues. Although they held a national meeting on January 17 and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of funding and pressure on local social and business leaders, held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be difficult to break. They also noted rural communities tended to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they discarded it to vote en masse for another. 7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz also publicly recommended voting against it because it was seen as not revolutionary enough. They criticized the government for making too many concessions to the opposition during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21, including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive. However, they have a relatively small following, and some, like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected MAS margin of victory shrunk in January. Edgar Patana, leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto union leaders, and the majority of social groups have recommended voting for the constitution. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Opposition Feisty, But Realistic - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be battling more to limit the margin of defeat than to win. In Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the "No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine departments (Reftel E). Although a current privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34 percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic scenario. He predicted that Morales would succeed in personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and leverage his cult of personality. Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and discrediting the results of "any election that uses this voter roll" (Reftel C). 9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but also building a foundation for a likely run for the presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors) who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three presidential contenders to show opposition unity and xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they exclusively represent the indigenous.8 xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy. "Political parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx La Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on issues and distance themselves from the party moniker. "We need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the old leaders. This will take time." 10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in resources by de-personalizing the constitution and "convincing people on the street that is not in their best interests." Although he conceded the "no" campaign would ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud between Morales and Church, corruption charges against government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy as emerging factors in December and January that created an opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on television and radio shows is proof of government panic. "Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win)," said xxxxxxxxxxxx. "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they often know little about." According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking in fluent Aymara. He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's indigenous languages. Later he challenged President Morales to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks poorly. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fraud, Doubts, and Questions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public of the security of the election rolls, which came under scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008 recall referendum. Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their August referendum victory by five to seven points through fraud at several levels (reftel C). While many international observers groups are expected to view the January 25 constitutional referendum -- including the European Union, the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) -- the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are fair. Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff that they have no faith in international observers. The committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President Morales in the August 2008 referendum. However, the civic committee said that the fact that international observers blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an honest review of the constitutional referendum. Civic committee members also noted that small numbers of observers, generally based in the city, will not be able to stop widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they believe most of the August 10 fraud took place. 12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS. As part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior elections and the number added during this cycle. While all departments projected to vote against the constitution had a net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz (38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a curious reckoning, considering population and migration trends to the contrary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Pando At Center of Storm, Again - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best chance to win in five departments. By winning the popular vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more credibly claim to have support throughout the country. Pando has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the strength of the MAS continues to rise. And with fewer than 32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable department to even small amounts of fraud or voter registration changes. 14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate. Besides disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters from the Altiplano (Reftel B). xxxxxxxxxxxx added that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake identities via the police role in issuing national identity cards (which can then be used to vote). (Reftel C). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - January 26: What Happens Next? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that a general election prompted by passage of the new constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B). xxxxxxxxxxxx said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the blanks" with new implementing legislation. He also said the Senate would clash with the government on assigning new borders for electoral districts, needed for the general election. xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to." He said Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the people" and then have President Morales rule by decree (Reftel D). 16. (C) Despite the official government position that President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel to Spain for the operation. xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not perform the surgery. Article 238 is also of consequence to the post-January 25 political landscape. It would establish that all other government officials must stand down three months before general elections expected in 2009, with the notable exception of the president and vice president. Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the opposition-controlled Senate. It is unclear why the opposition waited until the final week before the referendum to complain about the article or why they accepted it during marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters surrounding the congress and threatening violence. - - - - Comment - - - - 17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway. While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what they announce they will do. In this case, 66 percent seems to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out all the stops to reach that level. With at least two-thirds support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine departments under his belt, President Morales would be able to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution quickly. Practically speaking, this will put great pressure on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate, to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of implementation legislation. If they do not, Morales and others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree. Using similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia. Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of an issue in December. 18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the MAS victory, not the victory itself. While Morales continues to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President Garcia Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent estimate on January 21. The margin matters. If the constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many observers feel this would represent a relative defeat, especially when Morales himself has set such high expectations. On the other hand, we are equally concerned that large-margin victories in media luna departments could lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting them on a collision course with the national government. A solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to 60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures. URS